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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981641-CA 
v. : 
LAWRENCE CARDINAL, ; Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. i 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his conviction following entry of his conditional plea of guilty 
to two second-degree felony counts of possession of a controlled substance in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, Utah, Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(2) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did an officer's detection of the odor of marijuana during the 
course of a lawful traffic stop furnish reasonable suspicion to 
question defendant and ask to search his car? 
"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a 
bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a clearly 
erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Ribe, 
876 P.2d 403,405 (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993). "Appellate courts . . . afford 
the trial judge 'a measure of discretion' in applying the reasonable articulable suspicion 
standard to a particular set of facts." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App. 
1997) (quoting Pena. 869 P.2d at 939). 
2. Under the totality of circumstances, was defendant's consent to a 
search of his car voluntary where, in response to the officer's request to 
search, he answered "I guess so, [inaudible] you want," and 
immediately exited the car without being asked to get out? 
Whether a consent to search is voluntary is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995); State v. Thurman. 846 
P.2d 1256, 1271-72 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons cr things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on January 27, 1998 with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (100 pounds of marijuana), a second-degree felony in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1998); and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute (psilocybin mushrooms), a second-degree felony in 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(iv) (1998) (R. 1-2). Following a 
preliminary hearing and arraignment, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained from a search of his vehicle (R. 21, 25,43-63, 110). After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 82-79, 115). 
Defendant entered guilty pleas on both counts, conditioned on retention of his right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress (R. 83-99). The trial court sentenced 
defendant on September 22, 1998 to two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in prison 
(R. 104-05). The trial court suspended the prison terms, and ordered defendant to serve 
one year in jail and 36 months probation (id.). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 102). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As defendant drove north along 1-15 just south of Nephi, his rear license plate 
caught the eye of officer Paul Mangelson (R. 115 at 7). The plate had white strips across 
it, which made Mangelson suspect that the plate had been altered (R. 115 at 7, 10-11, 32). 
When the officer pulled ahead of defendant to check the front plate, he observed that its 
number did not match the rear plate, in violation of vehicle registration laws (R. 115 at 7). 
He decided to pull defendant over (id.). 
Defendant rolled his car window down as Mangelson walked up to the car, and the 
officer detected the smell of raw marijuana (R. 115 at 12). As a 31-year veteran of the 
Utah Highway Patrol who made eight to ten arrests per month involving large quantities 
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of drugs, Mangelson had smelled raw marijuana hundreds of times (R. 115 at 5-6, 25,28). 
On this particular occasion, the officer recalled that the odor "was only there momentarily 
as I got that initial blast. It was enough that I could pick up on it immediately and knew 
that there was something there I'd probably have to say [the odor] was slight. You 
know, it wasn't a, an overwhelming odor, but, but it was there" (R. 115 at 12). 
When Mangelson smelled marijuana, the stop became more than a simple traffic 
stop in his mind. "[I]t was a definite . . . drug stop in the making at that point..." (R. 12-
13). 
As he spoke with defendant, Mangelson noticed that defendant was extremely 
nervous, with "hands shaking so bad he could hardly hand me the registration" and dry 
lips (R. 110 at 7, R. 115 at 13-14). "He rank[ed] right up there amongst the probably the 
scaredest Tve ever seen" (R. 110 at 7). 
Mangelson examined defendant's Virginia driver's license and the car's temporary 
registration permit (R. 115 at 13-14). The permit had a different number than either of 
the license plates (R. 115 at 15). Defendant told the officer that he lived in Virginia, that 
he had been in Las Vegas, and that he was going to Cincinnati to visit his children (R. 115 
at 17). Mangelson privately wondered why defendant would have traveled all the way 
out west on his way to Cincinnati to visit his kids (id.). 
"It didn't add up to me," Mangelson recalled. "There were a lot of things that 
started clicking in my mind" (id.). He observed that defendant was traveling northbound 
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on a known drug corridor from the Las Vegas / Tucson area "where drugs are readily 
available" to "an area where drugs are many times transported" (id.). Also, "I had 
smelled the odor of raw marijuana. He was scared to death, had very little visible luggage 
in the vehicle. I could see a road atlas, I could see fast food containers in the front of the 
car. These are all things that are synonymous with people that transport drugs up and 
down our highways" (id.). 
Mangelson and defendant had the following exchange: 
Officer: You aren't doing anything illegal, are you? 
Defendant: No. 
Officer: You're petrified, that's why I'm— 
Defendant: No, I'm not. 
Officer: Your hands are trembling. 
Defendant: Yeah, I know, I'm wondering why I got pulled over. 
Officer: Nothing illegal in the car, is there? 
Defendant: (inaudible) 
Officer: Don't do any drugs or anything like that? 
Defendant: (inaudible) 
Officer: Don't care if I look real quick, do you? 
Defendant: In my car? 
Officer: Yeah. 
Defendant: (inaudible) 
Officer: Huh? 
Defendant: I guess, (inaudible) you want. 
(Videotape of stop at 10:38:32 -10:38:55). As defendant uttered the words, "I guess . . . 
[inaudible] you want," the videotape shows that he directed his attention to the inside of 
the car and moved his hands and arms as if he were removing keys from the ignition, 
setting the brake, or otherwise preparing to exit the vehicle (id.). Then, without any 
further requests from the officer, defendant exited the car (id.). The entire exchange took 
approximately half a minute (id.). Mangelson did not tell defendant that he had authority 
to search the car, did not exhibit any force, did not draw or touch his service revolver, and 
spoke in his usual tone of voice (id, R. 115 at 18-19). 
Mangelson made a quick check of the interior of the car, during which time 
defendant behaved "like a caged lion. He was back and forth, pacing back and forth. 
Obviously nervous" (R. 115 at 22). Mangelson found no drugs in the passenger 
compartment, and asked defendant if he could look in the trunk. Defendant refused, 
saying, "You're not going to look in the trunk" (id.). 
Mangelson "checked" defendant to make sure that the marijuana smell was not 
emanating from him, then got into the back seat of the car (R. 115 at 23). "As I got in the 
back seat area and got in beneath the top of the back seat and the bottom you could 
change that smell from a slight odor . . . to an obvious smell of raw marijuana.... I think 
you could say it was strong" (id.). 
Mangelson opened the trunk, which released an "overwhelming" smell of raw 
marijuana (R. 115 at 24). Inside were three duffel bags containing about 200 pounds of 
marijuana (R. 115 at 24-25). The trunk also concealed a plastic bag containing 
psilocybin mushrooms (R. 115 at 24). Mangelson placed defendant under arrest (R. 115 
at 26). 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found that although 
Mangelson initially stopped defendant for improper licensure, the plain smell of 
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marijuana combined with defendant extreme nervousness gave the officer justification to 
investigate further: 
As he investigated the apparent license plate problem, the officer 
noticed the odor of raw marijuana. In addition, the officer observed that 
Defendant's hands were shaking and that he appeared to be extremely 
nervous. The odor of marijuana combined with Defendant's extremely 
nervous behavior, raised the officer's suspicion that Defendant was engaged 
in more serious criminal activity. The officer's raised suspicion justified 
further detention and investigation. 
Additional investigation lead [sic] the officer to believe there was 
marijuana in the trunk of the vehicle. The officer testified that as he 
searched the rear passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle he "could 
smell the odor [of marijuana] more clearly . . . and it seemed to be coming 
from the trunk area." . . . Under federal law, the odor of marijuana gives an 
officer justification to search a vehicle, even absent a warrant or some other 
exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent.... "[Marijuana] has 
a distinct smell and . . . the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable 
cause requirement to search a vehicle or baggage." [citations omitted] 
Utah courts have also applied the "plain smell" doctrine under the 
Fourth Amendment.... Because Officer Mangelson was lawfully searching 
the rear passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle when he detected 
the odor emanating from the trunk, his subsequent search of the trunk was 
justified, even absent a warrant, under the "plain smell" doctrine. 
(R. 79-82, Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer, who 
smelled raw marijuana as he walked up to defendant's car, had reasonable suspicion to 
detain defendant for questioning. Defendant fails to acknowledge controlling Utah case 
law which holds that the plain smell of marijuana furnishes not merely reasonable 
suspicion supporting a detention, but probable cause to search. The trial court's 
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conclusion that, based on the smell of marijuana and defendant's extreme nervousness, 
the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant was correct as a matter of law. 
This Court need not reach defendant's claims that his consent to the officer's 
search of the passenger compartment was involuntary. Since the odor of marijuana 
provided probable cause, the officer could have searched defendant's car regardless of 
whether defendant consented to the search. In any event, the circumstances in this case 
were not coercive, defendant was not under duress, and his consent was voluntary and 
unequivocal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SINCE THE PLAIN SMELL OF MARIJUANA FURNISHES 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
OF A VEHICLE, THE OFFICER'S QUESTIONING 
REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS AND 
REQUEST TO SEARCH DEFENDANT'S CAR WERE 
JUSTIFIED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Defendant does not challenge the validity of Officer Mangelson's initial stop of 
defendant's vehicle for displaying unmatched license plates. Appellant's Brief at 7. 
Instead, he claims that by questioning defendant about the presence of drugs and by 
requesting permission to search the car, the officer exceeded the scope of detention 
justified by the observed traffic violation. Appellant's Brief at 5,13. 
During a valid traffic stop, an officer may "briefly detain the vehicle and its 
occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and the driver's license.... [0]nce 
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the driver has produced a valid license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he 
must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police 
for additional questioning." State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, under certain conditions, a 
lawful traffic stop may be extended beyond the scope warranted by the violation: 
Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must be supported 
by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable 
suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from 
the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop. 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (citing to State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 
181, 183 (Utah 1987): State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 199 H: State v, 
Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990)). 
In this case, the officer not only had reasonable suspicion to believe more serious 
criminal activity was afoot, he had probable cause. Mangelson smelled marijuana before 
he and the defendant exchanged a single word. "'It is well settled that the odor of 
marijuana emanating from a vehicle establishes probable cause for the warrantless search 
of that vehicle."9 State v. Wright. 977 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting State v. 
Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969, 972 (Utah App. 1992)); see also State v. Mavcock. 947 P.2d 695, 
697 (Utah App. 1997) (odor of marijuana furnishes probable cause for warrantless search 
of vehicle); State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220,227 (Utah App. 1995) (same); State v. 
South. 885 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah App. 1994) (plain smell of marijuana provides probable 
cause for warrantless search of residence), rev'd on other grounds. 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 
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1996); State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424,426 n. l(Utah App. 1993) (odor of marijuana 
provides probable cause for search of vehicle). 
"Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that9 an offense has 
been or is being committed." State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
Brinegar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879 
(1949)). Probable cause is a more stringent standard than reasonable suspicion, and 
involves a higher level of suspicion. State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 
1992) (citing United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 
Here, the officer was unwavering in his testimony that although the smell of 
marijuana was only momentarily present, "it was enough that I could pick up on it 
immediately and knew that it was there" (R. 115 at 12). Based on the officer's testimony, 
the trial court found that the officer immediately detected the faint odor of raw marijuana 
(R. 82). Also, the trial court found that Officer Mangelson observed that defendant was 
extremely nervous (id.).1 The court concluded that those two circumstances resulted in 
*In his brief, defendant focuses on cases holding that a suspect's nervousness alone 
is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Appellant's Brief at 8-10. Both 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause are determined by examination of the totality of 
circumstances. State v. Strickling. 844 P.2dat983. This Court has recognized that 
nervousness may appropriately "be considered in conjunction with other relevant and 
objective facts" in determining whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion are 
present. State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 541 (Utah App. 1997). Here, the trial court did 
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the officer's "raised suspicion," and that the raised suspicion justified further detention 
and investigation (R. 80). 
Given the wealth of Utah case law holding that the plain smell of marijuana 
establishes probable cause to search a vehicle, the trial court's conservative holding that 
the smell of marijuana raised the officer's suspicions sufficiently to justify further 
detention and investigation was correct as a matter of law. State v. Dudley. 847 P.2d 424, 
426 (Utah App. 1993) ("the odor of marijuana provided not only reasonable suspicion to 
prolong detention, but also probable cause to search the vehicle... .Because we 
determine that the trooper had probable cause at the initiation of the traffic stop, we need 
not address the reasonable suspicion argument."). Indeed, the trial court would have been 
correct had it concluded that Officer Mangelson had probable cause when he initially 
detected the odor of raw marijuana, and that the officer needed no additional justification 
to either detain defendant or to search his vehicle in its entirety. 
Defendant contends that because the officer testified that the odor was "slight" and 
that it was evident only during the "initial blast" as defendant lowered the car window, 
the circumstances did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. Appellant's Brief at 11-12. 
However, the "slight" or fleeting nature of the smell does not diminish or negate the 
not rely on defendant's nervousness alone in finding that reasonable suspicion supported 
expansion of the scope of detention justified by the apparent registration violation. 
Instead, the court found that defendant's nervousness coupled with the plain smell of 
marijuana gave rise to reasonable suspicion. 
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officer's definite, unequivocal testimony that he smelled marijuana as he approached the 
vehicle (R. 115 at 11-12). See, e ^ , U.S. v. Crotinger. 928 F.2d 203, 205 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(faint smell of marijuana established probable cause for search of automobile); State v. 
Zamora. 559 P.2d 195, 197 (Ariz. App. 1976) (faint odor sufficient); U.S. v. Rosa-
Valenzuela. 993 F.Supp. 466,469 (1997) ("slight odor of marijuana alone may justify a 
search of a vehicle"); State v. Bunts. 867 S.W.2d 277, 281 (Mo. App. 1993) (faint 
marijuana smell alone established probable cause). In this case, the officer testified as to 
his qualifications and extensive experience in identifying the smell of marijuana (R. 115 
at 6). The trial court accordingly chose to believe his testimony that he smelled marijuana 
as he walked up to defendant's car (R. 82). State v. Wright. 977 P.2d at 507 ("a court 
may consider an officer's particular experience and education . . . . For instance, an 
officer's special familiarity with how controlled substances smell is germane to 
evaluating whether an officer had probable cause to search and seize") (citing State v. 
Spurgeon. 904 P2d 220, 225 (Utah App. 1995)); State v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, 1041 n. 
4 (Utah App. 1993) ("it is the prerogative of the trial court to evaluate the evidence and 
choose what testimony to believe"). 
In short, the record amply supports the trial court's finding that the officer smelled 
marijuana as he approached the car, and defendant has not shown that this finding was 
clearly erroneous. In light of that finding, the trial court correctly concluded that the 
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smell of marijuana, coupled with defendant's extreme nervousness, created reasonable 
suspicion justifying further detention. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO 
THE OFFICER'S SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE 
Defendant asserts that his consent to the search of his vehicle was not voluntary 
because it was obtained through coercion and duress.2 Appellant's Brief at 5, 17. He 
further asserts that his consent to the search was equivocal and "a mere acquiescence to 
the trooper's request." Appellant's Brief at 13, 17. 
This Court need not reach the issue of defendant's consent because, as argued 
above, the plain smell of marijuana gave the officer probable cause to search the car 
2The trial court did not expressly determine that defendant's consent was 
voluntary. However, defendant specifically raised the issue below, and the trial court was 
given the opportunity to consider his claims. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Suppress (R. 43-63). The court specifically found that defendant consented to 
the search, and denied the motion to suppress (R. 82). By rejecting defendant's claims 
that his consent was not voluntary, the trial court implicitly found that the factors 
considered in evaluating whether a consent is voluntary, discussed infra at 14-15, 
weighed in favor of voluntariness. State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1988) 
(by denying defendant's motion to suppress, the court impliedly found that defendant's 
statements were voluntary); see also State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) 
(conclusion of law regarding nonexistence of reasonable suspicion could be implied from 
trial court's findings of fact and was consistent with trial court's suppression order); State 
v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 n. 18 (Utah 1993) ("when a trial court's findings and 
conclusions are less than crystal clear, we may search [the record] for grounds upon 
which they may be upheld"). Cf. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 788 n. 6 (Utah 1991) 
("this court upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings of fact on the record 
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings"). 
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without his consent. Dudley. 847 P.2d at 426 n. 1 ("we need not reach the consent issue 
because we affirm the convictions on the ground that the odor of marijuana provided not 
only reasonable suspicion to prolong detention, but also probable cause to search the 
vehicle"). Since this Court may affirm on any proper grounds, even those not relied upon 
by the trial court, the Court need not address the consent issues defendant raises. State v. 
Redd, 954 P.2d 230,236 n.8 (Utah App. 1998). 
In any event, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's consent was both 
voluntary and unequivocal. 
A. Defendant's Consent was Voluntarily Granted and Obtained Without 
Duress or Coercion. 
"Whether a consent is voluntary depends upon 'the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." 
State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1206 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1262-63 (Utah 1993)). A consent is invalid if it is obtained through duress or 
coercion. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206. Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion 
include 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 
2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 
3) a mere request to search; 
4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 
5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. 
Id: State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 1980); State v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 8 
(Utah App. 1994). 
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Each of the five factors listed above weighs in favor of the conclusion that 
defendant voluntarily consented to the search, and that his consent was not induced by 
duress or coercion. First, the officer did not make a claim of authority to search the car 
(videotape at 10:38:32 to 10:38:55, R. 115 at 18-19). Second, the officer did not exhibit 
any force (id.). Third, he did not demand to search the interior of the car, but politely 
asked, "Don't care if I look real quick, do you?" (videotape at 10:38:32 to 10:38:55). 
Fourth, defendant cooperated with the search, answering "I guess, [inaudible] you want" 
to the officer's request, and voluntarily exiting the car (id.). Finally, the officer did not 
employ any tricks or deception to gain defendant's consent (id.). 
Defendant's subsequent refusal of the officer's request to search the trunk of the 
car provides further evidence that defendant's consent to the search of the passenger 
compartment was voluntary and not obtained through duress or coercion. When the 
officer initially asked if he could search the car, defendant gave his verbal consent and 
exited the car immediately, without being asked to step out. However, when the officer 
later asked if he could search the trunk, defendant strenuously objected, saying "You're 
not going to search the trunk." His objection to the subsequent search indicates that 
defendant was aware that he could refuse consent. Knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is a factor indicating that consent to a search is voluntary. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 
1980), State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990). The fact that defendant 
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felt free to refuse the officer's second request to search belies his contention that his 
initial consent was obtained by duress and coercion. 
In sum, a consideration of all relevant circumstances proves that defendant 
voluntarily consented to the search of the passenger compartment. 
&• The Totality of Circumstances Present in this Case Demonstrates that 
Defendant's Consent to the Search was Unequivocal, 
Defendant asserts that "I guess, [inaudible] you want" cannot be regarded as an 
unequivocal grant of consent. Appellant's Brief at 17. Although the words with which 
defendant gave consent indicate that he was apprehensive about the search, a valid 
consent need not be enthusiastic. Rather, an expression of consent should not be capable 
of multiple interpretations. Here, defendant's consent was unequivocal. 
"Equivocal" means, "[h]aving a double or several meanings or senses, 
[s]ynonymous with 'ambiguous.'" Black's Law Dictionary 542 (6th ed. 1990); State v. 
Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 902 (Utah App. 1993). Defendant's verbal response to the 
request to search was not equivocal because, under these circumstances, it could only 
have one meaning. In the context of defendant's verbal exchange with the officer, the 
words "I guess, [inaudible] you want" manifest assent, and cannot be alternatively 
interpreted as a refusal of consent. $217.590 in U.S. Currency v. State. 970 S.W.2d 660, 
667 (Tex. App. 1998) ("The response ["I guess so"] is necessarily equivocal, if at all, 
only with respect to [defendant's] consideration of the wisdom of his answer, not as a 
response to an officer asking for permission to search a vehicle," finding consent 
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involuntary for other reasons); see also. People v. Stark. 275 Cal. App. 2d 712, 714-15 
(1969) ("I guess it is all right-sure" constitutes clear, unequivocal consent to search). 
A determination of whether a consent is voluntary is fact sensitive, achieved by 
consideration of the totality of circumstances. Harmon. 854 P. 2d at 1039, State v. 
Archuleta. 925 P. 2d 1275,1277 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Carter. 812 P. 2d 460, 463 
(Utah App. 1991). Defendant's nonverbal behavior also supports the unequivocal nature 
of his consent. As defendant gave his verbal consent to the search, the videotape shows 
him preparing to leave the car, and then, without hesitation, opening the door and 
stepping outside. The officer did not request that he exit the car; instead, he voluntarily 
and immediately left the car of his own volition. State v. Bredehoft. 966 P.2d 285, 293 
(Utah App. 1998) (defendant's nonverbal cooperation with ambulance personnel 
performing blood draw evidenced his voluntary consent to blood draw). 
Under the totality of circumstances present in this case, defendant's verbal 
agreement to the search, together with his unprompted exit from the car, indicate that his 
consent to the search of his passenger compartment was unequivocal. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no novel or complex issues, the State does not request 
that oral argument be set, or that a published opinion issue. 
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ADDENDUM A 
TILED IN 
UT-t E ISTKICT COURT 
S T A T E Of U T A H 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURt c:j^T v 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH S3 JUL 3 ' Pil U'' 5 ' ty 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
LAURENCE J. CARDINAL, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 981600029 
DATE: July 2, 1998 
JUDGE: RAY M.HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: David Sturgill 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having 
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and in opposition to 
the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On January 22, 1998, OfBcer Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol observed 
Defendant's vehicle traveling northbound on 1-15. The rear license plate of Defendant's vehicle 
first drew the officer's attention. He "noticed something white across the plate." Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript (Transcript), pp. 5. Officer Mangelson caught up to the vehicle and took a 
closer look at the vehicle's plates. He stopped the vehicle because he observed a discrepancy 
between the numbers that appeared on the front and back license plates. 
Officer Mangelson approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked to see 
Defendant's license and registration. The officer noticed that Defendant's "hands were trembling" 
and that he appeared to be extremely nervous. Transcript, pp. 9-10. Also, the officer 
immediately detected a faint odor of raw marijuana. 
Because the officer suspected Defendant possessed marijuana he asked for Defendant's 
consent to search the vehicle. Defendant consented to a search of the driver and passenger 
compartments, but when he was asked to open the trunk, Defendant refused. As the officer 
searched inside the vehicle, he "could smell the odor [of marijuana] more clearly... and it 
seemed to be coming from the trunk area." Transcript, pp. 12. Officer Mangelson testified that 
he searched the trunk without Defendant's consent because of the strong smell of marijuana that 
appeared to be emanating from the trunk. Transcript, pp. 14. Officer Mangelson discovered in 
the trunk large quantities of marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms. Defendant was immediately 
mirandized and placed under arrest. 
Defendant asserts that Officer Mangelson's detention and search of his person and 
vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
As a result, Defendant moves the Court to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful 
search. 
Opinion of the Court 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated [.]" U.S. CONST, amend IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, § 
12. The concern of the Fourth Amendment is against "unreasonable" or unjustified searches and 
seizures; "reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. 
In Utah, a peace officer may stop and question a person, without violating the Fourth 
Amendment, "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, 
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)). Once the reasons for the initial 
stop have been satisfied, however, the individual must be allowed to proceed on his or her way. 
Any further detention after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial stop is justified only if the 
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. See State v. Robinson. 
797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, Officer Mangelson initially stopped Defendant for what he believed to be 
improper licensure of the vehicle. The officer first noticed something peculiar about the rear 
license plate-he observed a white horizontal strip across the plate. Upon closer inspection, 
Officer Mangelson noticed a number discrepancy between the front and rear plates. Based on thai 
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discrepancy, he decided to stop Defendant's vehicle. Clearly, the officer's belief that Defendant's 
vehicle was not in compliance with Utah license and registration laws was reasonable, and 
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therefore, the initial stop was proper. See State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(holding trooper's inability to identify the paper in the vehicle's back window as a valid temporary 
registration permit justified the stop of the vehicle). 
As he investigated the apparent license plate problem, the officer noticed the odor of 
raw marijuana. In addition, the officer observed that Defendant's hands were shaking and that he 
appeared to be extremely nervous. The odor of marijuana combined with Defendant's extremely 
nervous behavior, raised the officer's suspicion that Defendant was engaged in more serious 
criminal activity. The officer's raised suspicion justified further detention and investigation. 
Additional investigation lead the officer to believe there was marijuana in the trunk of 
the vehicle. The officer testified that as he searched the rear passenger compartment of 
Defendant's vehicle he "could smell the odor [of marijuana] more clearly . . . and it seemed to be 
coming from the trunk area." Transcript, pp. 12. Under federal law, the odor of marijuana gives 
an officer justification to search a vehicle, even absent a warrant or some other exception to the 
warrant requirement, such as consent. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
recently noted this general rule: "This court has long recognized that marijuana has a distinct smell 
and that the odor of marijuana alone can satisfy the probable cause requirement to search a 
vehicle or baggage." United States v. MorinT 949 F.2d 297, 300 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing United 
States v. Merryman. 630 F.2d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1980)). The constitutional basis for this rule is 
that "[a] strong, emanating odor of marijuana comes within the 'plain view1 doctrine and need not 
be ignored by officers." United States v. ManbeckT 744 F.2d 360, 380 n.34 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing 
United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied sub nom., Fletcher v. 
United States. 451 U S . 972 (1981)). 
Utah courts have also applied the "plain smell" doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. 
In State v. Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231,1235 (Utah App. 1989), the Court of Appeals noted: "Objects 
in 'plain view' constitute o n e . . . exception [to the warrant requirement], and may be seized 
without a warrant if the police officer is lawfully present and the evidence is clearly incriminating. 
This exception encompasses evidence within 'plain smell[.]'" Because Officer Mangelson was 
lawfully searching the rear passenger compartment of Defendant's vehicle when he detected the 
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odor of marijuana emanating from the trunk, his subsequent search of the trunk was justified, 
absent a warrant, under the "plain smell" doctrine. 
Order 
Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied. 
cc: David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney 
G. Fred Metos, Attorney for Defendant 
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